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Abstract
In cooperative game theory allocation of earnings to players may take place on the basis of
selectors or—more restrictively—consistent selectors, or on the basis of a permutation repre-
senting the queueing of the players. This note gives a graph theoretic characterization of those
situations in which the latter allocation method results in allocation with consistent selectors.
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1. Introduction
For a 9nite set N = {1; : : : ; n} we consider functions, the so-called selectors, assigning
to each non-empty subset of N an element of that subset; formally, a selector is a
function  : 2N\{∅}→N with (S)∈ S for every non-empty subset S of N .
In [2] the notion of selector is introduced in a game theoretic context, where the
elements of N are the players, and a non-empty subset S of N is a coalition. In this
context, a selector assigns a representative to each coalition. We will adopt the notation
and terminology from the game theoretic literature since the problem that we tackle in
this note is inspired by an application in this 9eld.
A selector  is called consistent if the representative of any coalition S is also the
representative of the subsets of S containing that representative; i.e., if S, T ⊆N , and
T ⊆ S so that (S)∈T , then (T )= (S).
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A selector is mainly used in allocation methods of the total earnings among the
players. Assuming that these earnings (e.g., the so-called dividends of a cooperative
game) are split up over the coalitions, allocation is simply performed by giving the
earnings of each coalition to its representative. If the average is taken over all selectors
or over all consistent selectors, this allocation method results in the well-known Shapley
Value (cf. [3,1]).
A diEerent approach towards allocation is the assignment of the earnings according
to a speci9ed queueing (1), (2); : : : ; (n) of the players, as follows: allocate to player
(j) all positive earnings of those coalitions S with no member to the left of (j) (so,
(j) is the 9rst of the players in S), and all negative earnings of those coalitions S
with only players to the left of (j) (i.e., (j) is the last player in S). In other words,
if we let the players take their turn from right to left then each player, when it is his
turn, may grab all positive earnings of coalitions containing him and not already taken,
and he may pass on the negative earnings of coalitions as long as there are still players
waiting in that coalition; if not he has to accept also these earnings. Allocations based
on this method are called greedy for obvious reasons, and considered 9rst in [1]; there
it is shown that taking the average of all greedy allocations (one for each permutation
) again results in the Shapley value.
It is not hard to see that the greedy allocations correspond to allocations based
on speci9c selectors. Moreover, in [1] it is shown that the convex hull of all greedy
allocations is equal to the convex hull of all allocations based on arbitrary selectors, the
so-called selectope. Also, the question is raised to characterize those situations where
all greedy allocations correspond to consistent selectors. Because allocations based on
consistent selectors are exactly the marginal values (cf. [4]) this question concerns
the coincidence of the Weber set (i.e., the convex hull of the marginal values) and
the selectope. The purpose of the present note is to give a (hyper)graph theoretic
characterization of this coincidence.
2. The characterization result
For a permutation  denote the player in coalition S who has no predecessors in S by
min (S) and denote the player in S for whom all other players in S are predecessors
by max(S). Let R and L denote two disjoint subsets of coalitions. In the game
theoretic context the elements of R are those coalitions with negative earnings, and L
those with positive earnings.
We say that a selector  is an (L;R)-match for permutation  if
(S)= max

(S) for all S with S∈R; (1)
(S)= min

(S) for all S with S∈L: (2)
Observe that the representatives of the coalitions in R according to  are the Right-
most players according to , and the representatives of the coalitions in L according
to  are the Left-most players according to . Further, observe that an allocation on
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the basis of an (L;R)-match yields the same outcome as the greedy allocation method
based on queueing according to .
A reformulation of the question at the end of the Introduction is: For which pairs
(L;R) do all permutations have consistent (L;R)-matches?
Let R and L be disjoint sets of coalitions. A sequence S1; S2; : : : ; Sk of k diEerent
coalitions from R∪L is called an (L;R)-cycle if there are k diEerent players i1; : : : ; ik
such that
(i) for each r=1; : : : ; k, it holds that ir∈Sr ∩ Sr+1 (where Sk+1 denotes the coalition
S1);
(ii) at least one coalition is taken from R and at least one from L.
(L;R)-cycle free collections are exactly those pairs that we are looking for:
Theorem. Let R and L be disjoint collections of coalitions. The following two con-
ditions are equivalent:
(a) There exists no (L;R)-cycle.
(b) For each permutation  of N there exists a consistent (L;R)-match.
Proof. For the implication (b)⇒ (a), suppose there exists an (L;R)-cycle S1; S2; : : : ; Sk .
Since each (L;R)-cycle contains two consecutive coalitions, one in L and one in R,
we may assume without loss of generality that S1∈L and Sk∈R. Choose diEerent
players ir in the intersection of Sr and Sr+1, for every r=1; : : : ; k. One may also as-
sume ir =∈ S‘ for all r=1; : : : ; k and ‘ = r; r + 1 because otherwise at least one of the
two shorter cycles S‘; S‘+1; : : : ; Sr and S‘; Sr; Sr+1; : : : ; S‘−1 is again an (L;R)-cycle,
so that the proof can be restarted with the appropriate shorter cycle.
With these players i1; : : : ; ik de9ne the following mapping :
(ir)=
{
|{ j: j¿r and Sj∈L}| if Sr∈L;
n− |{ j: j¿r and Sj∈R}| if Sr∈R:
Observe 9rst that (ir)∈N for all ir because an (L;R)-cycle contains at most n
coalitions. Let L denote |{j: j∈L}|, and R denote |{j: j∈R}|. With these notations we
have (ir)6L whenever Sr∈L, and (ir)¿n−R whenever Sr∈R. Further, (ir) = (il)
whenever Sr , Sl∈L or Sr , Sl∈R, so that  is injective. By extending  to N and by
taking the positions of the other players arbitrarily among the remaining positions
L+ 1; : : : ; n− R, we obtain a permutation.
We will now show that the permutation  has the property ir = min (Sr) for
all Sr∈L. For Sr∈L there are only two players among i1; : : : ; ik who are mem-
ber of Sr , namely ir−1 and ir (where the index 0 is taken to mean k). If Sr−1∈L
then (ir−1)= (ir) + 1, and if Sr−1∈R then (ir−1)¿n − R¿L¿(ir). Therefore,
(ir−1)¿(ir). The other players of Sr obtain positions between L+ 1 and n− R, so
that we must have ir = min (Sr).
The property ir = max(Sr) for all Sr∈R can be shown similarly.
Now suppose that there exists a consistent selector  satisfying (1) and (2). So,
by construction of  we have (Sr)= ir for each r=1; : : : ; k. Consider the coalition
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S =
⋃k
r=1 Sr . Then (S) is a member of one of the coalitions S1; : : : ; Sk , say Sr . Consis-
tency thus implies that (S)= ir; therefore, (S)∈ Sr+1, so that, again by consistency,
(S)= ir+1, a contradiction. This proves the implication (b)⇒ (a).
In order to prove the implication (a)⇒ (b), suppose there are no (L;R)-cycles. Let
 be an arbitrary permutation of the player set. Consider the directed graph (N; E) on
N with edge set E equal to the union of the sets {(max(S); j): j∈S, S∈R}, and
{(min (S); j): j∈S, S∈L}.
Suppose there exists a directed cycle in this graph, say i1; : : : ; ik . Then consider
for each edge (ir , ir+1) in this cycle a coalition Sr∈R ∪ L such that ir , ir+1∈Sr ,
and ir = max(Sr) if Sr∈R or ir = min (Sr) if Sr∈L. It is impossible that all these
coalitions can be chosen from R, because otherwise (i1)¿(i2)¿ · · ·¿(ik)¿(i1).
Similarly, not all these coalitions can be chosen from L. This implies that S1; : : : ; Sk
is an (L;R)-cycle, a contradiction. Hence, there are no directed cycles in (N; E).
Therefore, there is a permutation j1; : : : ; jn, with the property that each edge (jl; jr) in
E satis9es l¿r. Consider the following selector  which chooses for each coalition S
the right-most player:
(S)= jr with r= max{l: jl∈S}; S ⊆ N:
This  is consistent. Now let S∈R, and suppose that (S) = max(S). This implies
(jl; jr)∈E for max(S)= jl and (S)= jr , and, therefore, l¿r; but this contradicts the
de9nition of . Therefore,  satis9es (1). Similarly one shows that  satis9es (2).
This concludes the proof of the Theorem.
Clearly, no (L;R)-cycles exist if the carriers of both collections have at most one
player in common, that is, |(⋃{S: S∈R}) ∩ (⋃{S: S∈L})|61.
There is no clear intuition of the existence or non-existence of a (L;R)-cycle in the
game theoretic context although the very appealing implication of the non-existence is
that the set of selector-based allocations coincides with its subset of allocations coming
from consistent selectors. For a detailed discussion the reader is referred to [1].
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